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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
was overcome as a matter of law in a New York case where such
testimony was uncontradicted and unshaken."'
However, it has been held that interested testimony will not
warrant an instructed verdict for the defendant, 22 and since the
jury is not bound to believe the testimony of such witnesses, a
verdict against such evidence will not be set aside. 23 But when the
court says that it is still a question for the jury every time the
defendant puts in interested testimony, the court forsakes its usual
duty of determining whether the defendant's evidence has destroyed the plaintiff's prima facie case. In every other situation
the court as competent to decide whether the testimony is such that
a verdict might be directed for the defendant, but in this situation
the presence of "interested" witnesses somehow renders the court
incapable of deciding whether the defendant is entitled to a verdict.
Ordinarily the office of a presumption is merely to have the
defendant proceed with the evidence, and when he has put in credible evidence that is at least entitled to some weight, the presumption should disappear and the parties should have the case decided
on the evidence as given. Such a method of dealing with presumptions would seem to be fulfilling their purpose. But in the
McMullen v. Wwren Motor Co. case, the court held that the presumption was still a part of the plaintiff's case even though the
defendant had put in the testimony of interested witnesses. There
seems to be no logical reason why this presumption as such should
not be removed from the trial when the defendant has introduced
evidence to offset it. To require the defendant to produce disinterested testimony before the presumption will be met is placing a
burden on the defendant which will almost always prevent him
from prevailing.
PA-uL M. GoODE.
'aPowers v. Wilson, 203 App. Div. 232, 196 N. Y. S. 600 (1922).
2'Kneff v. Sanford, see note 17, supra.
Purdy v. Sherman, 74 Wash. 309, 133 P. 440
Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).

(1913)

Mitchell v.

DuREss-BusiNEss COMPULSION-RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS.

The plaintiffs
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leased a service station from the defendant Associated Oil Company, agreeing to handle defendant's products exclusively. The lease was for ten
years from March 3, 1928, and contained an option to purchase. In February, 1929, the parties entered into a contract for the purchase of gas
and oil. From July, 1929, to May, 1931, the plaintiffs were overcharged
by the defendant for their gasoline, but paid under protest. This
action was begun in May 1931, to recover the amount plaintiffs had paid
in excess of the contract price. The court held that the plaintiffs could
recover, since they had to pay or suffer a forfeiture of their lease. The
payments were held to have been made under business compulsion, Ferguson v. Assoctated, Oil Company, 74 Wash. Dec. 5, 24 Pao. (2) 82 (1933).
In recent years the law of duress has undergone a great change. As
first announced, the rule was that payments could be recovered because
of duress only if actual physical harm to the payor had been threatened.
This was followed by the doctrine of "duress of goods," which was that
a payment made to release one's property from an unlawful detention
was made under duress. Lonergan v. Buford 148 U. S. 581, 37 L. Ed. 569
(1893). The modern rule is much more liberal, holding that If the payor
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was deprived of his freedom of will, the payment was made under duress
and may be recovered. Broum v. 'Wlorthsngton, 162 Mo. App. 508, 142
S. W 1082 (1912). This embraces the doctrine of "business compulsion,"
which is that if failure to make a payment would subject one to the
loss of a capital investment, the payment is made under business cmopulsion and may be recovered. See 79 A. L. Rt. 655.
The Washington Court has recognized this doctrine. Olympta Brewing
Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 494, 173 Pac. 430 (1918) Sunset Copper Go. -q.
Black, 115 Wash. 182, 196 Pac. 640 (1921) Johnson v. Townsend & Co.,
161 Wash. 832, 296 Pac. 1046 (1931) Ramp Buildings Corp. v. Northwest
Bldg. Co., 164 Wash. 603, 4 Pac. (2d) 507, 79 A. L. R. 651 (1931). See 7
Wash. L. 1. 248. The instant case clearly falls within that rule, since
forfeiture of the plaintiff's lease, with its option to buy, would be a loss
of a capital investment. Illinois Merchant's Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335
Ill. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929) Dale v. Sinon, 267 S. W 467 (Texas 1924).
A vigorous dissent in the instant case contended that the plaintiff
should not be able to recover because he had continued to make these
payments for so long a time. This overlooks the fact that the business
compulsion continued, and was present at the time of each payment. The
payment need not be disaffirmed until the removal of the duress. Duke
v. Force, 120 Wash. 599, 208 Pac. 67 (1922). And it has been held
that the making of such continuous payments does not prejudice the
right to recover them. Swift d Courtney & Beecher Co. v. United States,
111 U. S. 22, 28 L. Ed. 341 (1898) Kamonitsky v. Corcoran, 161 N. Y. S.
756 (1916).
G. V P.
HUSBAND AND Wlr--CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS. In an action by
W for alienation of affection maintained after H had married D, W on the
stand testified that one morning at breakfast H had called her "Marie,"
D's name, and she had asked who Marie was. This was objected to. Held:
W was incompetent to testify to the above, or to any other communication
made by one to the other while the marriage relation existed, either
while it subsisted or afterward, Kirkpatrzck v. Wickunre, 25 Pa. (2) 371
(Kan. 1933).
The Rev. Stat. of Kan., 60-2805, states, "The following persons shall
be incompetent to testify
(3) Husband and wife, for or against each
other, concerning any communication made by one to the other during
the marriage, whether called while that relation subsisted or afterward."
Most of the states do not have a statute phrased in terms of incompetency, but are similar to the Washington statute, Rem. Rev. Stat. 1214,
which states, "The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses.
(1) A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife without the
consent of the wife, 'nor a wife for or against her husband without the
consent of the husband, nor shall either dursng marriage or afterwards,
without the consent of the other, be examined as to any communication
made by one to the other during mnarrage. But this exception shall not
apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, nor to a
criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the
other."
Thus the Washington statute contains three parts: (1) the common
law incompetency to testify for or against the other, modified by permiting where consent has been given; (2) the privilege of the parties against
communications made during marriage; (3) exceptions as to both.
Under the Kansas statute it is clear that "any communication" is
privileged, and so it is held, French v. Wade, 35 Kan. 391, 11 Pac. 138
(1886). However, in the states having statutes similar to Washington
there is a divergence of opinion concerning the meaning of the words
"any communication." Some adopt the literal meaning and hold that "all
communications" are barred; California, People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138,
23 Pac. 229, 17 Am. St. Rep. 223 (1890)
Colorado, Park v. Park, 40 Colo.
354, 91 Pac. 830 (1907) Illinois, Donnan v. Donnan, 236 Ill. 341, 86 N. E.
279 (1908)
Virginia, Wilkes' Adm'r v. Wilkes, 115 Va. 886, 80 S. E. 745
(1914), Oregon, Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Ore. 448, 194 Pac. 686 (1921).
Others hold that it is confined to "confidential communications"- Iowa,
Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N. W 314, 2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 708
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(1905) Michigan, Thayor v. Thayor 188 Mich. 261, 154 N. W 32 (1915)
and,
Utah, In re Van Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942 (1903)
Washington, Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 64 Pac. 819 (1901), State
v. Snyder 84 Wash. 485, 147 Pac. 38 (1915).
The protection of the marriage relationship is the basis and purpose
of these statutes. In view of the status of the parties the law deems It
more advantageous to society to hold as confidential matters thus revealed, rather than to permit the parties to disclose them in open court.
As a requisite for the application of the privilege four conditions should
exist: (1) Communication must originate in a confidence that it will not
be disclosed, (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and, (4) The injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2d Ed.), sec. 2285. The privilege is to secure freedom from apprehension of disclosure in the mind of the one desiring to
communicate. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2d Ed.), sec. 2340.
Thus it appears that the rule limiting the protection to confidential
communications Is the better rule, since there Is no need to protect all
communications, but only those given in confidence that they will not be
ferreted out in public. And, since Washington holds the statute only
applies to confidential communications, it may be questioned whether
the court would hold the conversation in the instant case confidential. In
Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 64 Pac. 819 (1901), the court held
confidential communications to be "those Induced by the marital relations." It Is difficult to see how a husband's slip of the tongue was "induced by the marital relations."
Granting that the privilege exists, it is generally held to be the personal privilege of the one making the communication, and thus, being personal, can only be waived by him. Derham. v. Derham, 125 Mich. 109, 83
N. W 1005 (1900) State v. Snook, 93 N. J. L. 29, 107 AtI. 62 (1919) (attorWIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2d Ed.), sec. 2196. Hence it
ney and client)
would appear that in an action against a third party where W claims
the marital privilege, if the court denies it, and the third party objects,
the overruling of the objection should not be sufficient grounds for a reversal and a new trial, since the evidence Is otherwise admissible. And,
it has been so held. Ooles v. Hursch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929)
State v. Snook, supra, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2d Ed.), sec. 2196. The
Oregon court, in facts similar to the instant case, held that where the possessor of the privilege objects the court must exclude the privileged communications, and that any court may exclude them upon its own motion
when it appears that a witness is about to testify to a privileged communication, but that a denial of the privilege will not be grounds for a
new trial where the exception is taken by a third party.
Wigmore explains this by saying that since the offered testimony is
relevant, the only interest injured is that of the witness, and not the
third party. If the witness desires to prevent disclosure, he should refuse
to testify, and upon being committed for contempt sue out a writ of
habeas corpus. He admits, however, that the majority view is contra
and gives the third party against whom the testimony is offered grounds
for reversal and a new trial.
It is difficult to find any real protection if the rule laid down by
Wigmore, and followed by some courts, is adopted. Chafee, in 35 Harv. L.
Rev. 686, asserts that although the view taken by Wigmore is logically
correct, it seems practically desirable to allow the party to take advantage
of such a denial, for otherwise error by the court will not be sufficiently
checked, since if the court rules in his favor (party objecting) evidence
will be excluded to the injury of the offering party who can except, while
if the opponent cannot except to a denial of the privilege, the court will
be tempted to deny it and avoid the chance of a reversal. Also, very few
witnesses will be willing to subject themselves to contempt proceedings,
and possible imprisonment if the doubtful point of privilege is decided
against them. They will rather testify and, as pointed out in a dissenting
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opinion in State v. Snook, 94 N. J. L. 271, 109 Atl. 289 (1920), it thus becomes necessary to a preservation of the privilege that an erroneous
affirmation or denial of the privilege shall be grounds for a new trial,
both by a party against whom an erroneous affirmation was entered, and
by a party against whom an erroneous denial was entered, although a
third party.
Washington apparently follows the majority view. In Hartness v.
Brown, 21 Wash. 55, 59 Pac. 491 (1899), a case involving the attorney and
client privilege, which is comparable to the confidential communication
privilege between husband and wife, the court holds that, in the interest
of sound public policy, the objection can be made by anyone against whom
the evidence is offered, although the privilege is for the benefit of the
client, and he alone can waive it.
Therefore, in Washington, we find: (1) that the privilege only exists
as to "confidential communications;" (2) that it is a privilege in favor
of the communicating one, and he alone can waive it; and, (3) that if
offered against a third party, he may object in the interest of sound
public policy, and a denial of the privilege will be ground for reversal.
C. P. Z.
HUsnAND AND WIFE-LIABILITY FOR EXPENSES OF LAST ILLNESS AND
FONERAL. The inheritance tax appraiser refuses to allow deduction from
the estate of W for reimbursement of H., who has paid the expenses of
W.'s last illness and funeral from his own funds. H. protests on ground
that the inheritance tax statute expressly provides that such expenses
shall be deducted before the imposition of the tax. Held: The items are
not deductible; H. is primarily liable therefore, and the estate of W.
only secondarily liable. Riley, Controller v. Robbins et al., - Cal - 25
Pac. (2d) 539 (1933).
At common law, medical attention was one of the "necessaries" which
the marital relationship required the husband to furnish. He was likewise chargeable with the expense of the wife's proper burial; her separate estate was not liable therefor. 31 A. L. R. 1500. (Cases collected).
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States follow the common
law rule. Re Wertnger, 100 Cal. 345, 34 Pac. 825 (1893)
Stonesifer v.
Shrver 100 Md. 24, 59 A. 139 (1904)
Stone v. Tyack, 164 Mich. 550, 129
N. W 694 (1911). And the rule is applicable although the parties were
living apart at the time the expenses were incurred. Scott v. Carothers,
17 Ind. App. 673, 47 N. E. 389 (1897)
Barnes vz. Star- 144 Md. 218,
124 A. 922 (1923). Even a divorce suit pending between them does not
seem to relieve the husband from liability. Gleason v. Warner, 78 Minn.
405, 81 N. W 206 (1899). Nor do statutes making last illness and funeral
expenses charges or preferred claims against the estate, change the rule
in these jurisdictions. Kenyon 'v. Brzghtwell, 120 Ga. 606, 48 S. E. 124
(1904)
Rocap v. Blackwell, 137 N. E. 726 (Ind. App. 1923)
Of course, the wife may assume the liability by contract in jurisdictions where married women have that power. Bowen v. Daugherty, 168
N. C. 242, 84 S. E. 265 (1915). Or she may make such provision in her
will. Rocap v. Blackwell, 137 N. E. 726 (Ind. App. 1923). And in many
jurisdictions following the common law rule, the wife's estate is held
secondarily liable, especially where the husband is financially unable to
pay. Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 80, 25 Am. Rep. 598 (1875) Re Wenrnger
100 Cal. 345, 34 Pac. 825 (1893).
There is, however, an increasing minority holding the estate of a
married woman liable for the expenses of her last illness and funeral.
Courts which reach this result do so generally on the basis of statutes
making either one or both items charges or preferred claims against the
estate. 31 A. L. R. 1500. (Cases collected). Under this rule the husband is
-entitled to reimbursement from the wife's estate if he pays these expenses
-with his separate funds. Constantinsdes v. Walsh, 146 Mass. 281, 15 N. E.
631 (1888) Watktns v. Brown, 89 App. Div. 193, 85 N. Y. Supp. 820 (1903).
Washington has adopted the minority view.. Our statute makes both
last illness and funeral expenses preferred claims against the decedent's
estate. Rem. Rev. Stat., sec 1541. Thus a physician may bring an action
against the estate of a decedent for services rendered during his last
illness irrespective of contract. Cunnzngham 17. Lakin, 50 Wash. 394, 97
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Pac. 447 (1908). And a husband who has paid the expenses of his wife's
last illness with his own funds is entitled to reimbursement from her
separate property by virtue of the statute. Smith v. Eichner 124 Wash.
575, 215 Pac. 27 (1923). So too where the parties are living under separation agreement. Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 Pac. 813 (1923).
The rule is the same with regard to funeral expenses. Smith v. Saul, 128
Wash. 51, 221 Pac. 977 (1924).
Where the husband leaves no property, the wife is liable for his
funeral expenses if they are rendered with her knowledge and consent.
Butterworth v. Teale, 54 Wash. 14, 102 Pac. 768 (1909). But her liability is
only secondary. Butterworth v. Bredemeyer, 74 Wash. 524, 133 Pac. 1061
(1913)
And since the primary liability is on the estate under the
statute, the creditor must exhaust his remedy against the primary fund
before he can resort to the secondary. Butterworth v. Bredemeyer, supra.
Of course, an express promise to pay the expenses of a funeral will create
a primary liability against the person so promising. Nothing less than an
express promise will create the liability, however. Direction to furnish
service is not enough. Butterworth v. Bredemeyer supra.
The question of whether deduction may be made for expenses of last
illness and funeral before imposing the inheritance tax does not seem to
have arisen in Washington. In general, deductions for such are held good
under inheritance tax laws. 9 A. L. R. 671. (Cases collected). Our inheritance tax statute reads: "
shall be subject to a tax
., after the payment of all debts [owing by the decedent at the time of his death
and a reasonable sum for funeral expenses
" Rem. Rev. Stat., sec.
11201. Read in conjunction with the statute making such expenses preferred claims against the estate, it seems clear that these are properly
deductible. In view of the foregoing Washington decisions and the wording
of the statutes on the subjects, it would appear that given the same facts
as the principal case, Riley v. Robbsns et al., a contrary result would be
reached in this jurisdiction.
M. W
STATUTES--Co-OSTRUCTION-EERGEN1cy

RELEF LEGISrLATIoN.

Application

for a writ of mandate to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant
on the state treasury in favor of the treasurer of Thurston County in
payment of a voucher for expenses incurred by that county in the administration of direct or home relief. Direct relief as distinguished from
work relief is defined by statute in Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. Ann. 1933, sec.
9992-1 to 9992-34, inclusive, as shelter, food, clothing, and household supplies, while work relief is defined as wages paid for the performance of
services or labor under the emergency construction program. A Special
Emergency Relief fund was created, twenty thousand dollars being the
initial appropriation for the carrying out of the provisions of the act.
By the provisions of Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. Ann., 1933, see. 9992-35 to
9992-40, inclusive, a bond issue was authorized, the proceeds to be deposited in the special emergency fund, ten million dollars being appropriated immediately for construction. work for unemployment relief.
(Italics ours.) Defendant resisted the issuance of the writ by arguing
that no part of the ten million dollar bond issue had been appropriated
for the furtherance of home relief. Held: writ of mandate granted. State
ex rel. Draham v. Yelle, 75 Wash. Dec. 28, 26 Pac. (2d) 622 (1933.)
A cursory reading of the statute raises the question whether or not
the words "for construction work for unemployment relief" limit the
use for which the ten million dollar bond issue is to be expended. In the
instant case the court adopts the plaintiff's contention that the bond
issue was to finance a general relief program and not merely a "work
relief" program. In so construing the legislative intent, the majority of
the court must interpret the phrase "for construction work for unemployment relief" as if it read "for construction work and unemployment
relief," giving to the phrase "unemployment relief" the same meaning
as "home relief." To achieve this result the court relies on dictum from
an earlier case under the same statutes and a line of Washington cases
In harmony with the implications to be derived from the dictum. In State
ex rel Hamilton v. Martin, 73 Wash. Dec. 158, 23 Pac. (2d) 1 (1933) the
court said, "The relief act, which is interrelated with and referred to in
the bond act, has for its purposes, as determined by its title, first, to
relieve the people of the state from hardships and suffering caused by
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unemployment, which is identical with one of the objects sought to be
obtained by the enactment of the bond act." Beginning with Davidson 'v.
Carson, 1 Wash. Terr. 308 (1870), the Washington court has held that
acts passed at the same session of the legislature and relating to the
same subject matter, are in part matersa and must be construed together, so that, if possible, a proper and harmonious effect may be given
to all of them, although they contain no reference one to another and
were passed at different times. Pierce County ex rel Maloney v. Spike, 19
Wash. 652 (1898) State ex rel Miller v. Griffin, 46 Wash. 489, 90 Pac. 661
(1907)
White v. North Yakzma, 87 Wash. 191, 151 Pac. 645 (1915).
A statute should be construed as a whole and most reasonably to
accomplish the legislative purpose. State ex rel Chamberlin v. Daniel,
17 Wash. 111 (1897) Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537 (1898). A statute
should be construed in the most beneficial way, to favor public convenience and to oppose all prejudice to public interests. State ex rel McKenzte v. Forrest, 11 Wash. 227 (1895).
It is expressly provided that the relief act should be liberally construed to the end that the work of the administration should be succesful
in allaying the misfortune. Wash. Rem Ret. Stats. Ann. 1933, see.
9992-28.
The dissenting judges adopt a literal interpretation of the phrase
"for construction work for unemployment relief," declaring it to be the
purpose of the court to declare the law as it is written and not to rewrite a statute or dictate the policy that the legislature should pursue.
This is tersely phrased, "The Legislature said what it meant and meant
what it said."
To support its conclusion, the minority relies on a rule of statutory
construction as firmly embedded in Washington law as that relied on
by the majority to reinforce its conclusions. The history of a legislative
measure may be reported to, in order to aid in its interpretation. Howlett
v. Cheetha., 17 Wash. 626 (1897 Scouten v. City of Whatcom, 33 Wash. 273,
74 Pac. 389 (1903) State ex rel Fair v. Hanilton, 92 Wash. 347, 150 Pac,
379 (1916) Stovell v. Toppenssh School Distnct No. 19, 110 Wash. 97, 188
Pac. 12 (1920). Reference to the legislative history of the instant statutes indicates that the restrictive feature of Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats. Ann.
1933, sec. 9992-37, was added by way of amendment after a discussion of
the evils of the dole form of direct relief.
To read the provision "for construction work and unemployment relief" would alter the meaning of the section and bring it within the
constitutional admonition that appropriation measures should specify
the object of the appropriation. Article VIII, Sec. 4, of the Constitution
of the State of Washington.
The sharp division of the court indicates a conflict between two lines
of statutory construction. While the exigencies of the present situation
seem to demand a decision in keeping with that of the majority, the
adoption of such a rule of statutory construction as the general rule to
be followed in future cases would mean the establishing of an unfortunate precedent.
M.A.M.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE. Decedent was walking on
the right hand side of the highway, in violation of statute (Rem. Rev.
Stat., see. 6362-41). Defendant, coming from behind in an automobile,
was driving at an excessive rate of speed and in a negligent manner.
Defendant saw decedent and sounded the horn several times. Decedent,
who was wearing a woolen cap pulled down over his ears, did not hear
the horn, and defendant was aware that he did not hear. Decedent was
struck and killed. The court refused to give instruction on last clear
chance, and plaintiff appeals. Held: That the court should have instructed
on the conscious form of the doctrine. Flagg v. Vander Yacht et al., 74
Wash. Dec. 475, 24 Pac. (2d) 1063 (1933).
The doctrine of last clear chance, as applied in this jurisdiction,
appears in two forms, the distinction being based on whether the defendant
was conscious or unconscious of the plaintiff's position of peril.
In the conscious form, where the defendant actually realizes the plaintiff's position of peril in time to avoid the accident by exercise of due
care, it is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff's negligence has ceased
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at any point prior to the accident. Brown v. Seattle City Ry. Co., 16 Wash.
465, 47 Pac. 890 (1897)
Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541, 228 Pac. 302
(1924)
McAbee v. French, 150 Wash. 646, 274 Pac. 713 (1929). The instant case properly applies this form of the doctrine, since defendant had
actual knowledge of the plaintiff's position of peril in time to avoid the
accident.
The unconscious form of the doctrine involves a situation where defendant is not actually aware of the plaintiff's position of peril in time
to avoid the accident by exercise of due care, but is under a duty to so
discover m time to avoid the injury However, before this form of the
doctrine can be applied, it must appear that the plaintiff's negligence
has come to rest an appreciable time before the accident, leaving the plaintiff in a helpless position. Herrtck v. Washington Water Power Co., 75
Wash. 149, 134 Pac. 934 (1913) Lung v. Water Power Co., 144 Wash. 676,
258 Pac. 832 (1927)
Reese v. Tacoma Railway & Power Co., 148 Wash.
207, 268 Pac. 599 (1928). This helpless position must be based on physical
inability to avoid the accident, and mere inadvertence is not sufficient.
Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941 (1913)
Johnson v. Seattle, 141 Wash. 385, 250 Pac. 409 (1926)
Larson v. Tacoma Railway d
Power Co., 146 Wash. 660, 264 Pac. 419 (1928), though some of the cases
have failed to make this distinction. Chase v. Seattle Taaicab & Transfer
Co., 78 Wash. 537, 139 Pac. 499 (1914) Stephenson v. Parton, 89 Wash.
653, 155 Pac. 147 (1916) Settles v. Johnson, 162 Wash. 466, 298 Pac. 690
(1931)
Since the doctrine of last clear chance applies only where the defendant
has been negligent, and the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence,
Locke v. Puget Sound Int. R. & P Co., 100 Wash. 432, 171 Pac. 242, L. R. A.
1918D. 1119 (1918), it would appear to be an exception to the rule of
contributory negligence. The basis for the doctrine suggested by the
Washington court is that the contributory character of the plaintiff's
negligence is removed, because defendant has the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, and hence, his negligence is the proximate cause and
plaintiff's a remote cause. Herrick v. Washington Water Power Go., supra.
However, it is submitted that proximate cause fails as a basis, since
if a non-negligent third party were involved, he could doubtless recover
from either plaintiff or defendant. 5 Iowa Law Bulletin 36. The doctrine
could be better based on a frank admission that it is an exception to the
sometimes harsh rule of contributory negligence. 26 Harv. Law Rev. 369, 2
Wash. Law Rev. 53, as applied in those situations where the defendant
is in a better position to control than the plaintiff. It follows that the
doctrine will not be invoked where the parties had equally good chances
to control the situation. 66 Univ. Pa. Law Rev. 73. As applied in this
jurisdiction, the doctrine is readily sustainable on the basis suggested.
R. E. Y.

